Proportionality for Military Leaders
[S]oldiers also are not excused when they fight in bad faith.
-Franciscus de Victoria

Introduction
According to Geoffrey Best, the noble concept of proportionality is burdened with a "lumbering, unattractive and inexpressive" name. 1 Whether it is the name, or merely the complexity of the subject, proportionality has not received its due in the United States (US).
Leaders here have failed to demonstrate an adequate understanding of the subject. This matters because proportionality is the single most important factor in waging moral armed conflict.
Further, proportionality can be an integral aspect of waging efficient and effective war.
In this paper I will discuss why military members should care about justice in war, and why proportionality is the cornerstone of just war theory. The heart of the paper is the explanation of the four distinct concepts of proportionality, and an assertion that an understanding of all four is necessary for US leaders to make moral decisions about future armed engagements.
The Importance of Justice in War
In 2000, the US is a hegemony with a military that appears to outstrip geometrically any potential threat to its security. Some might argue that questions about the justice of its military actions are irrelevant; after all, what entity can meaningfully criticize any moral or legal violations by the US? Despite the appearance of US invulnerability, there are good reasons for a policy of moral war-making.
One of the benefits of being "gentlemanly" in warfighting is reciprocity. Whereas not every enemy will strictly follow moral codes, they are certainly less likely to do so if US actions are questionable. Related to that is the harder-to-quantify advantage that obtains to beneficent combatants. If the US maintains a reputation for moral treatment of the enemy, the likelihood of surrender is increased while the likelihood of an enemy fighting to the death is decreased. In the Persian Gulf Conflict, hordes of Iraqis surrendered to coalition forces (including one group that presented themselves as captives to a US drone aircraft!). 2 The opposite has also proven true.
Germans on the Western Front in World War II were more likely to surrender than those on the Eastern Front, largely due to the humane treatment of prisoners of war by the Western allies.
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Ensuring that wars are just and are prosecuted honorably will help to build and maintain coalitions. Fighting as part of a coalition team brought the US victories in both world wars and, arguably, honorable stalemates in Korea and Iraq. 4 Making its way without coalition partners beyond the "home team," the US went down to defeat in Vietnam. Despite the inherent difficulties involved in dealing with multiple governments and militaries, coalition warfare is here to stay. Those vital coalitions can be challenging to build for poor causes, and can be torn apart by atrocities in battle. Morality in war is part of the glue that binds coalitions together.
Besides, engaging in just wars justly is the right thing to do. Churchill, when pondering the Allied decision to bomb German cities wondered aloud: "Are we beasts?" 5 Many today would answer his rhetorical question in the affirmative. It is possible that obliteration bombing brought Germany and Japan to their knees sooner, but it was nonetheless morally distasteful.
"Bomber" Harris, the British architect of the bombing of Germany, was the only British service chief not awarded the customary honors after the war. Another advantage of moral warfighting is that just wars are easier to end. The US, along with coalition allies, has proven more than equal to the task of prevailing militarily in conflicts such as those in the Persian Gulf, the Former Republic of Yugoslavia and Haiti. The chapter that plagues the US the most is the final one oe the inability of the US to get out of those countries after the shooting war ends has been an albatross around its neck. Morality in war, while
certainly not a solution in and of itself, can prevent exacerbation of ethnic tensions. When civilians are killed in war, the grudge of surviving and future family members can span generations. This can only make achieving a permanent peace more difficult.
A final reason to maintain moral standards in war looks to the future. Put simply, times change. US dominance will not last forever. Conflicts arrogantly begun and prosecuted without regard for moral principles can create ill-will and make enemies around the world. With the turning of the seasons, asymmetric warfare, and decreasing support from the other nations of the world, the US could find itself isolated and vulnerable. Already, the "hegemony problem" and the perception that the US generally takes a selfish, "me-first" attitude toward foreign policy is beginning to erode the mandate the US inherited in the aftermath of the Cold War. 7 Perhaps the proper respect for morality in war will help prevent the fall of a future American Ozymandius.
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One of the great misunderstandings about rules of warfare is their purpose. It is not to assuage the consciences of liberal-minded civilians, but rather to protect combatants from the irrational and immoral behavior more likely to occur in war.
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Given, then, that waging our wars honorably is important, US leaders at all levels should be able to consider and discuss the moral implications of warfighting decisions. To do this, they must understand the concept of the "just war."
Just War Theory
The National Conference of Catholic Bishops, relying on the works of Augustine and Aquinas, eloquently summarized the elements of modern just war theory in a pastoral letter on war and peace. A just resort to war requires just cause, an authority competent to decide to go to war, a consideration of comparative justice, the right intention, the exhaustion of more peaceful means, a probability of success, and proportionality.
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Although the Bishops chose the items to emphasize different elements of just war thought, two additional concepts, just cause and comparative justice, can be considered under the heading of proportionality. Proportionality involves considering all the evil that will result from a war, and weighing it against the good that will occur or the harm that will be avoided. The definition is discussed in more detail later. The remaining concepts oe competent authority, right intention, exhaustion of peaceful means and probability of success oe are interesting in their own right, but are beyond the scope of this paper. And, they all pale before the proportionality issue;
i.e., a consideration of the justice of each belligerent's cause and the ills that will inevitably result from armed conflict. Proportionality is the keystone of just war theory. The proportionality discussed in this quotation, and in Secretary Perry's statement above, is not the proportionality upon which just war theory is based.
Proportionality does not preclude waging war to win. Misunderstandings over the term can lead to confusion in our military and diplomatic relations. The discussion below addresses the various forms of proportionality.
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Ad Bellum Proportionality
Jus ad bellum is the justice of going to war in the first place.
14 A fundamental proposition of just war theory is that there is always a presumption in favor of peace, so exceptional justification is required to cross the threshold of war. 15 That justification is the corpus of jus ad bellum.
Before a war has begun, its proportionality is considered, as "it is not every cause that is sufficient to justify war, but only those causes which are serious and commensurate with the losses that the war would occasion." 16 In other words, the good resulting from correcting every wrong does not necessarily outweigh the evil effects of armed conflict. That consideration does not close the book on the issue, however. During the course of an armed conflict, the situation can change so that continuing the fight would be disproportionate. I address both of these senses of ad bellum proportionality below.
Proportionality before the Conflict
Earlier in history, the justice of resorting to war was considered in each case before the fighting began. The rightness of a cause was a prerequisite for initiating conflict. The Greeks and Romans both had sophisticated rituals for determining the justice of a war. 17 
Saints
Augustine and Aquinas labored to refine the Christian theory of proper resort to war. In the seventeenth century, Hugo Grotius, considered the father of international law, waxed eloquent on the justice of resorting to war as well as justice during war. As the years passed, the balance tipped away from ad bellum proportionality. That shift was at least partly due to the loss of an international "honest broker;" as the power of the Roman Catholic church ebbed, the authority of the Pope to declare causes just became less convincing. 18 When every political authority in Europe looked to Rome for guidance, there could be in some sense a common vision of justice.
Of course, politics were important in the church, and the edicts issued could be at odds with the common perception of justice, but there is something to be said for certainty. No other institution has been able effectively to assume the role of the Roman Catholic church in this regard, although the United Nations continues to try.
Perhaps because of the lack of a neutral arbiter, or because ad bellum proportionality is the more complex, the continuing trend is to consider proportionality only as it relates to actions taken during the course of armed conflict. This has led to a formal assumption that both sides in a conflict are morally equivalent, at least at the start of hostilities. "Most modern theorists … devote little attention to the question of whether war is justified; they assume that it is and ask only … how it is to be conducted justly." 19 While this is theoretically the current state of affairs, states recognize that war can be more effective and more successful if they can present a case for Oddly enough, some argue that establishing the justice of a cause is contrary to humanitarian interests. That line of argument runs that combatants who are endowed with an undeniable sense of righteousness will be less constrained in their actions. When simple armed conflict becomes a holy war, a war that must be won, atrocities can be justified. 20 The problem with this argument is the converse: should we then convince troops that their cause is unjust to get them to behave? The idea that righteous soldiers are more wanton may have carried more weight in centuries past. The modern soldier, at least in the developed world, is less driven by religious imperatives than the typical eleventh century combatant. A better answer, in my opinion, is to provide good military leadership and education in the laws of war for all combatants, and then do everything possible to ensure the rules are followed. With these behavioral constraints in place, the knowledge of troops that their cause is noble should not lead to more abuses in war.
Although most of the focus recently has been on the justice (and proportionality) of actions taken during the course of a conflict, it is a serious failing to ignore the justice of the war in favor of strong rules in the war.
Once a nation makes a decision to go to war, the stage is set for a long series of terrible choices. Many times in war, none of the available options is good. It is important that war be waged only when the cause is worth killing and dying for. Once the lights go out and war begins, everything changes. It is easy to justify "collateral casualties" to save a trapped platoon, rescue a downed airman, or prevent friendly deaths, and on the smallest scale, those decisions might be right. They can hardly be just, though, if the conflict is an illegal aggressive action and the victims are merely fighting in the defense of their homeland. The idea behind considering ad bellum proportionality is to ensure that the inevitable losses to both sides that will result from a conflict are justified by the importance of the cause. Behaving honorably in a conflict, while certainly laudable, is insufficient to rectify an unjust beginning. "Following the rules is not exculpatory if you should not be involved in the enterprise in the first place." 21 What, then, are the factors a state must consider before resorting to war? "The probable good to be achieved by successful recourse to armed coercion in pursuit of the just cause must outweigh the probable evil that the war will produce." 22 In other words, nations should not go to war over trivial matters. Importantly, the consideration of the harm that will likely be caused by the war must include harm to all parties, not just the considering nation. Balanced against the evil that would result from an armed conflict, was that Britain could thereby preserve its sovereign rights over the islands, protect the interests of the British subjects, and conserve British prestige at home and abroad.
It would have been difficult for Britain to refrain from all military action in the face of Argentina's violation of its sovereignty, and I offer no judgment on the conclusion reached by the British government. The case is presented to illustrate the proportionality element in the decision to go to war, and how some causes, just on their faces, may still be debatable.
Proportionality in Continuing Conflicts
The determination of a nation that the expense in blood and treasure of a particular war is outweighed by the good that will result does not end the ad bellum proportionality issue. The "calculus of proportionality … is a continuing one," and must "be reviewed at critical points along the process of waging the war."
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During the course of a war it is possible, indeed likely, that the situation will change materially. Even in the absence of an enemy's surrender, its ability to make offensive war may be degraded to nil. In those cases, the harm that was to be avoided by war has been prevented and the armed action should end. In every case, the enemy's ability to reconstitute its forces and again pose a threat must be considered. Nevertheless, every war should begin with an end-state in mind, and when the end is reached, even just wars must stop.
Technically, this is not a separate category of ad bellum proportionality, but it seems to be so often forgotten that it deserves separate consideration. In a righteous rage a nation may let the desire for retribution take control. The moral course is to prevent or stop the subject harm while causing as little additional harm as possible, and then stop the fighting.
An example of continuing a just conflict beyond its "sell by" date may be the action against Iraq. Nine years after Iraqi international aggression was halted and the Iraqi armed forces were decimated, the US and some coalition allies remain at war against Iraq. Active hostilities in the Persian Gulf Conflict ended on February 28, 1991 with a cease-fire agreement.
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There have been periodic flare-ups since that time; e.g., Operation Desert Fox in December, 1998. US-led coalition forces still conduct small strikes against Iraq periodically in response to aggressive Iraqi acts against enemy warplanes flying over its territory, in what has been characterized as a low-level war of attrition. 30 Additionally, economic sanctions continue, arguably resulting in as many as 560,000 civilian deaths.
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The bottom line is "the causes justifying a war may cease to do so." 32 A nation waging moral war must reexamine periodically the justification for the war; it can change at any time.
In Bello Proportionality
Unlike the pre-war nature of jus ad bellum, jus in bello governs what you do when you get to war. 33 All the rules about appropriate weapons and methods, avoidance of civilian casualties and collateral damage, and everything that governs moral military conduct during the course of a war is part of the jus in bello. It is, succinctly, the justice of actions taken during war.
Soldiers, even if they are engaged in a just and lawful conflict, still must obey certain rules. "Men who take up arms against one another in public war do not cease on this account to be moral beings, responsible to one another and to God." 34 Both Grotius and Vattel recognized the importance of rules governing military actions in war. They considered the possibility that a war might be just for both sides; in such a case, jus in bello might be the most important consideration. Vattel in particular emphasized moderation in conduct of war. 35 With the decline of discussion regarding the justice of resorting to war, consideration of justice in the war increased. 36 In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, guidelines for the proper conduct of war were passed down informally in Europe. The rules were largely custom and past practice, but they formed the basis for what was later codified into a more formal law of war. Despite the advances in the moral conduct of war, it became evident that trying to govern only the conduct in the war without reference to the morality of the action itself was ineffective.
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Once war begins, perceptions of appropriateness change drastically. Things that might never have been considered during peacetime can become commonplace. In short, when the shooting starts, "military necessity" rears its ugly head. Military leaders may find it necessary to cause collateral casualties in order to destroy militarily important targets, for example. The problem of ignoring ad bellum proportionality is that a nation can be placed in a position to act in what Michael Walzer calls a "supreme emergency." 38 The purpose of considering proportionality before resorting to war is to ensure that the "supreme emergency" will be Further, it may be impossible for military members to ignore the injustice of a war while scrupulously obeying imperatives of justice in the war. We demand that military members follow rules in war and that they disobey illegal military orders. 42 It seems unlikely that a person could completely turn off his morality for one purpose but switch it right back on for another.
Arguing that service to country is a higher morality is unconvincing; Pol Pot's minions perhaps felt that way, but their immorality in carrying out mass slaughter is not thereby excused.
Even if military members decide they can turn off their consciences if necessary during the decision to resort to armed action, they still must concern themselves with the decision process. Military leaders have an obligation to provide advice to civilian leaders. That advice must go beyond military strategies and capabilities; military leaders must also address issues of justice and morality, at least before civilian authorities have made the final decision. "The ius ad bellum is addressed to the leaders of a state, its policy makers both civilian and military." 43 Any individual can be held legally responsible for "planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a war of aggression, or a war in violation of international treaties." 44 Military members are not excluded from the rule, so high-ranking members could certainly be liable.
This legal requirement merely gives incentive to follow the moral dictates of one's conscience.
Grotius, too, wrote of the dilemma of the military member's potentially conflicting duties of military orders and conscience ante bellum. He divided military members into two groups:
leaders (those responsible for the war) and followers. Those responsible for the war were potentially liable if the war was obviously unjust. 45 Other international law scholars argued that, in an unjust war, while captured common enemy soldiers might be set free, captured leaders should be killed. 46 Law is not the same as morality, but law often has its genesis in moral ideals.
De Victoria held military members responsible for considering the morality of wars in which they were employed. "If a subject is convinced of the injustice of a war, he ought not to serve in it, even on the command of his prince." 47 Taking the argument to its extreme, the chief prosecutor for France at one Nuernberg trial opined that every action taken by the aggressors in an illegitimate (unjust) war is illegal. 48 The court rejected this argument. In another case, the International Military Tribunal at Nuernberg made clear that the rules still applied, even in an illegal war. 49 Some of the highest German military leaders were convicted at Nuernberg of jus ad bellum violations, but other military members were spared that fate.
So, even though military members have an obligation to concern themselves with decisions to resort to war, most members actually involved in combat will be far enough removed from national command authorities to be absolved of legal liability for violations of the jus ad bellum. In those cases, even if national leadership was wrong in the decision to resort to war, individual combatants can protect themselves from war crimes convictions by following the rules in war. An unjust war is not justified by its being properly waged, but an immoral beginning to a conflict also does not void the necessity for acting appropriately in it. arguing that proportionality requires that the military force employed must resemble that of the enemy, to avoid excess enemy combatant casualties. 54 Allied victory in the war was a foregone conclusion. The city had also become a home for thousands of civilian refugees. Nevertheless, the Allies chose to bomb the city repeatedly. The three air raids were armed with high-explosive bombs to "crack open" the city and with incendiaries to burn it down. The raids were intentionally scheduled far enough apart so that fire brigades and rescue teams could make their way from outside the city to their demise in the subsequent attacks. 59 Although the number cannot be estimated with precision, perhaps 35,000
people died in Dresden, nearly all of them civilians, for no substantive military gain. 60 This action clearly failed the in bello proportionality examination.
Political Proportionality
The fourth and final type of proportionality, "political proportionality," is not proportionality in the same sense as the three types discussed above. Nevertheless, it is important to address as it is an area ripe for confusion. Proportionality in this sense is responding to enemy actions in a way that is essentially equivalent. It might more properly be called "measured response."
There may be many good reasons to respond in kind, rather than overwhelmingly, to a provocative act. Most commonly, measured response is a form of escalation control; a way to prevent the conflict from becoming more heated. to Iraqi aggression with all-out attacks in response. Instead, for political reasons, the US has established restrictive rules of engagement that prevent extreme responses. Instead, pilots who are threatened or attacked are limited to striking any Iraqi defensive system in response. 64 The example assumes that Iraq is the aggressor in that situation, and that the US acts in self-defense, although nearly ten years after the original UN resolutions authorizing the use of force against Iraq, those assumptions might be debatable, as earlier discussed. Although it is important, political proportionality is completely outside the realm of law and morality. It represents strategic and diplomatic conclusions, and may be considered or ignored without moral compromise.
Conclusion
There is a school of thought that morality in war is, in the long run, inhumane. "It is well that war is so terrible oe we would grow too fond of it." 65 If that reasoning is so, if less suffering and fewer civilian deaths make war more palatable, then proportionality should go out the window. I tend to look at it differently.
War and violence have been a part of the human experience since earliest recorded history. No matter how awful war becomes, there will be those who will wage it. If we continue to build peaceful problem-solving methods and to restrict war-making, someday war as a method of resolving differences might become rare (and humane even in those few instances). In that hopeful regard, proportionality helps ensure that war is as humane and moral as possible.
Military members must be engaged at every level to ensure that our nation's wars are moral. Before and during conflicts, they advise on the proportionality of engaging and continuing in the fight by weighing the likely good against the likely evil effects of the war. The pre-war military perspective helps determine whether a given objective is worth the killing and dying that will inevitably result from armed action. During a conflict, military leaders ensure that the expected military gain of every engagement outweighs the anticipated collateral damage.
Finally, they balance the benefits of using overwhelming force against those of a more measured response and advise on the best course of action.
Military leaders have an obligation to demand that blood be spilled only for the best of reasons. Proportionality provides a moral framework within which to reason through the equation balancing the dreadful cost of war and the factors compelling armed action. Military members' understanding of proportionality in all its forms is a first step toward protecting against an unnecessary loss of life.
Notes
